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Abstract 
In this paper we account for the U.S. Fed's response to money demand shocks by 
allowing for less-than-complete accommodation in the estimation of the Fed’s money 
supply policy rule. We find a significantly lower degree of money accommodation in the 
1979-1982 period, which hints at money targeting during that period rather than interest 
rate targeting. We identify the path of money demand and money supply shocks and 
comment on their effects on the dynamic behavior of money, interest rates, output and 
inflation: the monetary policy intermediate target seems not to be the key determinant 
of macro dynamics. Our results allow us to offer comments on the implications for 
monetary policy of both the degree of money demand accommodation -thus, of the 
intermediate monetary policy target- and the evolution (reduction) of macroeconomic 
volatility between 1984 and 2007. 
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1. Introduction 
Whether (and how) money demand shocks have historically influenced the path of 
interest rates and other macro variables remains an empirical question.
1 Indeed, most 
of the work on empirical monetary policy rules has ignored this possibility. A number of 
studies draw conclusions on the Fed's monetary policy stance before and after 1979 
without any reference to money demand shocks (see, for example, Clarida et al., 1999, 
or the papers in Taylor, 1999).
2 This paper is an attempt to integrate money demand 
shocks into the analysis of monetary policy and to assess the impact in U.S. macro 
fluctuations of different policy rules regarding money demand shocks. 
The widespread omission of money demand shocks in the empirical analysis of 
monetary policy is probably a consequence of the emphasis placed by New-Keynesian 
models -the current benchmark of most empirical monetary policy analyses- on interest 
rate reaction functions. If the interest rate is assumed to be the intermediate target 
through a monetary policy reaction function, the money market is always assumed to 
clear by having the Central Bank adjust the stock of money so that the equilibrium in 
the money market is consistent with the interest rate implied by the reaction function. In 
other words, if there were money demand shocks, the Central Bank would always 
perfectly accommodate them. Although the assumption is not explicitly stated, the 
setting also assumes that the role of money stocks is secondary and that the only 
transmission mechanism is the real interest rate channel. Empirical evidence of 
significant effects of money stocks on output and inflation (see for example, Honokan, 
1991; Us, 2004; Belke and Polleit, 2006, among others), however, has recently led 
researchers to complement the New-Keynesian model with money stocks (see Leeper 
and Zha, 2000, and Leeper and Roush, 2003, for empirical analyses or Collard and 
Dellas, 2005, for a theoretical framework where money demand shocks are explicitly 
included). This paper is an attempt to give a further step in this direction by 
investigating whether the Fed procedures have caused money demand shocks to play 
a significant and distinct role in the fluctuations of U.S. macroeconomic variables from 
1970 to 2007. 
The paper makes two main contributions. First, we explicitly allow for less-than-perfect 
accommodation of money demand shocks by the Federal Reserve and estimate the 
degree of accommodation across alternative periods. We find that the degree of money 
                                                 
1 This type of shocks may stem from temporary changes in the liquidity preferences of 
consumers (think, for instance, of the recent financial crisis as leading to a large increase in the 
willingness of consumers to hold liquid money), financial developments that lead to lower needs 
for cash or transitory changes in financing conditions. 
2  Other papers that have analyzed money demand are Akinlo (2006), Nagayasu (2003), 
Apergis (1997) and Cuthbertson and Taylor (1990) among others.   4
demand shock accommodation was significantly smaller during the money targeting 
period 1979-1982. An important implication of this result is that interest rate dynamics 
become significantly related to money demand shocks, as our estimates reveal. 
Additional findings are, first, that monetary policy was significantly procyclical during 
the 1970’s and early 1980’s but not so afterwards. Second, we find an implied interest 
rate response to expected inflation not significantly different across sample periods and 
less strong than usually found with complete money demand shock accommodation. 
A second contribution of the paper is to differentiate money demand and money supply 
shocks and to analyze separately their impact on macro dynamics. Among other 
results, our analysis reveals that the price puzzle is still present in the pre-1979 period, 
but it disappears afterwards, leading to “correct” macro dynamics even in the context of 
a VAR-type analysis. This result is consistent with Hanson (2004). 
We identify money demand shocks in a stylized simultaneous equation system where 
the Fed is allowed to choose the degree of accommodation of these shocks. The 
money demand shock is identified as a residual of a standard money demand function 
whereas the money supply shock is the residual of a real money supply rule. By 
assuming that the market for money stocks clears period by period, the parameters of 
the implied interest rate rule are functions of structural parameters in the money 
demand function and the endogenous money supply rule.
3 
Other studies have introduced money stocks in the monetary policy rule. Some 
examples are Leeper and Zha (2000), Ireland (2001) and Andrés et al. (2006). An 
important difference between our study and theirs is that while these studies let money 
stocks enter directly into the monetary policy rule, we include the money demand shock 
in order to capture the degree of money demand accommodation. Our results are, 
however, fully consistent with theirs in that money matters for interest rate dynamics. 
Our paper is also related to Bernanke and Mihov (1998). These authors carefully 
identify the different types of shocks hitting the money market and the Fed's stance 
regarding those shocks. A differential feature of our paper is that it displays structural 
elements, as we estimate parameters in the money supply and demand functions. In 
agreement with Bernanke and Mihov’s results, we find that money demand 
accommodation was significant all throughout the sample except during the 1979-1982 
money targeting period. Finally, and consistent with the results in Leeper and Roush 
                                                 
3 Galí (1992) also estimated a model with money supply and money demand functions, but some important 
differences have to be noted. First, we allow for an endogenous real money supply response to macro 
fluctuations whereas Galí’s policy shock is the first difference of nominal money supply. Second, our 
inflation and output equations, instead of being structural, are left unconstrained. This feature has the 
advantage of letting both money stocks and the interest rate affect inflation and output directly. As we 
show below, both channels turn out to be relevant. Third, we allow our money shocks to be autocorrelated 
which helps to reduce the problems induced by the high persistence of variables such as the interest rate.   5
(2003), we reject on empirical grounds the New-Keynesian model assumption that the 
only transmission mechanism is through (nominal or real) interest rate dynamics. 
Taken together, our results reinforce the view that money stocks matter empirically. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical 
framework for both the money market and for inflation and output dynamics. Section 3 
estimates the theoretical model for four distinct periods in which the operating 
procedures of the Fed have traditionally been described as being significantly different. 
Implications of the parameter estimates are first described and then the impact of 
monetary policy on the dynamics of the main macroeconomic variables is studied in 
detail. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. A Simple Model of the Money Market 
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t m  is real money demand at time t, yt is the output gap between t-1 and t, it is 
the average nominal interest rate between time t-1 and time t and 
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money demand shock at time t.  For the monetary authority (Federal Reserve), we 
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where 
s
t m  is real money supply, Et is the rational expectations operator conditional on 
information known at time t,  πt is period t  inflation and 
p
t ε   is the exogenous –
contractionary- monetary policy shock. The coefficient ν  (0  ≤  v  ≤  1)  measures the 
degree of money demand shock accommodation by the Federal Reserve. In our 
symmetric information framework, the Fed is able to exactly identify the exogenous 
money demand shock from the money demand equation (1). Indeed, the possibility that 
v may be different from one is precisely the key feature in our money supply process 
compared to those implicitly embedded in standard interest rate rules. 
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Equation (4) implies the following cross-equation parametric restrictions: 
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Note that (4) is an implied equilibrium condition which embeds both the stance of the 
monetary policy authority as well as the private sector behavior. Indeed, an interesting 
feature of our approach is that it allows us to identify and estimate both sets of 
structural parameters. We believe that the equilibrium condition is realistic, not very 
restrictive and allows us to relate our estimates to others found in the empirical 
monetary policy rules and money demand literatures. It becomes clear that if the 
monetary authority fully responds to money demand shocks (v = 1), then the interest 
rate does not react directly to money demand shocks. In this instance, we recover a 
standard monetary policy specification such as that proposed by Taylor (1993). 
However, insofar as the money demand shocks are not fully accommodated, v ∈[0; 1), 
they influence the interest rate path beyond their potential impact on expected inflation 
and output. This is the main differential feature of our modelling of monetary policy and 
one whose adequacy we test explicitly in section 3. 
We further allow both the exogenous money supply and demand shocks to follow 
AR(1) processes in order to account for the persistence of money market variables: 
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Combining equations (1) and (5) yields: 
d
t t d t t d t t t i i y y m m η ρ ζ ρ θ ρ + − + − = − − − − ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 .                          (7) 
Combining equations (1), (4) and (6) yields: 
+ − = − − − + − ) ( ) )( 1 ( 1 1 1 t t p t t t p t E E i i π ρ π β ρ ϕζ                                                       
                                 
p
t t p t t p t y y m m χη ρ ϕθ γ ρ ϕ + − − + − + − − ) )( ( ) ( 1 1                           (8) 
Since our focus is on the dynamics of the money market, we let inflation and output 
depend on a reduced-form VAR(1) of all macro variables: 
), , 0 ( N        , , , 1 14 1 13 1 12 1 11 π π π σ η η π π → + + + + = − − − − t t t t t t t m a i a y a a             (9) 
). , 0 ( N        , , , 1 24 1 23 1 22 1 21 y t y t y t t t t t m a i a y a a y σ η η π → + + + + = − − − −                    (10) 
The money market shocks have no contemporaneous effects on either output or 
inflation, as in Svensson (1997) or Christiano et al. (1999). However, we allow for the 
real money stock to affect output and inflation with a lag. Thus, monetary policy affects 
macro dynamics through two different channels: money and the interest rate. 
Equations (7), (8), (9) and (10) constitute our macroeconomic system, which can be 
expressed as: 
), , (       , t D N G X B X E A X E A X B t t t t t t t 0 1 12 1 12 1 11 11 → + + + = − − + η η      (11)   7
where Xt=(πt  yt  it  mt), A11, A12, B11, B12 and G are matrices of parameters and  t η  is the 
vector of exogenous i.i.d. shocks with diagonal variance matrix D. The rational 
expectations solution implies a reduced-form VAR(1) which can be obtained through 
numerical methods as in Sims (2002) or Cho and Moreno (2008):
4 
. t t t X X η Γ + Ω = −1           (12) 
 
3. Empirical Results 
We estimate the above macroeconomic system using data for the US, for the period 
1970-2007, ending right before the beginning of the financial crisis. Our analysis takes 
a historical approach: we distinguish four different subperiods in our data, which 
correspond to four relevant periods traditionally identified regarding the Fed’s monetary 
policy stance. After describing the data employed, we comment on the parameter 
estimates across subperiods and test some of the restrictions implied by our money 
market model. We comment on the path of the estimated money demand and money 
supply shocks and on their relationships with the money market variables. We then 
analyze the impact of these shocks on macroeconomic dynamics and, therefore, on the 
implications for monetary policy. This allows us to offer comments on the effects of 
different monetary policies –specifically, on the effects of the different degree of money 
demand shock accommodation-.  
 
3.1 Data and Estimation 
We use quarterly data from 1970:Q1 to 2007:Q2. The Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is used to construct our inflation 
measure. The output measure is real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), from the NIPA 
tables. We use the Federal funds rate and M2 as the short-term interest rate and the 
money supply measures, respectively. Both variables were collected from the Board of 
Governors website. Since GDP and M2 exhibit upward trends, we use an HP-filtered 
version of both variables. 
Estimation of the model’s parameters has been carried out using a two-step Bayesian 
procedure with the DYNARE econometric package. In the first step, the log posterior 
function is maximized in a way that combines the prior information of the parameters 
with the empirical likelihood of the data. In a second step, we perform the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm to compute the posterior distribution of the parameter set. Table 1 
shows the priors and the posteriors of the structural parameters of interest. The prior 
                                                 
4 Note that the system is over-identified: there are 19 parameters in our macro model and 26 in the VAR. 
Thus, our model can be expressed as a restricted VAR. The restrictions precisely allow us to identify the 
structural macro shocks and the parameters of the monetary policy and money demand functions.   8
distribution of the standard deviation of all shocks is inverse gamma, and that of the 
first order autocorrelation coefficients of the shocks is beta. The prior distribution of the 
remaining parameters is Gaussian. We pick prior means and standard deviations so as 
to extract as much information as possible from the data. For instance, the prior mean 
of the key accommodation parameter, v, is 0.5, with standard deviation 0.5. 
 
3.2 Parameter Estimates: A Historical Approach 
We estimated our model with the data split into four different subperiods: 1970:Q1-
1979:Q3, 1977:Q1-1982:Q4, 1984:Q1-2001:Q2 and 2001:Q3-2007:Q2.
5 Tables 1 and 
2 show, respectively, the structural parameter estimates of our macro model for the 
different subperiods and the coefficients of the implied interest rate rule (equation (4)). 
We emphasize that the implied interest rate rule is an equilibrium condition, since our 
policy equation is equation (2). All estimations yielded unique and stable solutions. We 
comment now on the results by subsamples placing special emphasis on the 
relationship between the Fed's procedures and our parameter estimates (most 
importantly, the accommodation parameter v). 
The 1970-1979 period remains highly controversial for monetary economists. It 
coincides with the run-up of inflation and the tenure of Arthur Burns as Federal Reserve 
chairman. While some economists have blamed the inflation of the 70s on the inertia of 
oil shocks (Blinder, 1982), others have pointed at the Fed's lax policies, which may 
have been the result of its lack of mandate (De Long, 1997) or of its wrong 
understanding of the economy (Romer and Romer, 2002). Research by Judd and 
Rudebusch (1998), Clarida et al., 1999) and others has found that the Fed did not react 
strongly enough against inflation during the pre-1979 period, whereas it did after 
Volcker's arrival at the Fed. Mishkin (2003) points out that while the Fed announced in 
1970 its commitment to use monetary aggregates as intermediate targets, the 
commitment was not very strong and the targets were consistently missed. In effect, 
the Federal Open Market Committee would set ranges for both the growth rate of both 
money aggregates and the Federal funds rate. 
Our estimates suggest that during this period the Fed was probably more focused on 
targeting the Federal funds rate than monetary aggregates: v is quite close to, although 
significantly lower than, one. This suggests that the Fed modus operandi was closer to 
interest rate targeting than to money targeting but that the interest rate targeting was 
not, as suggested by the above mentioned references, effectively achieved. Moreover, 
and as suggested by Mishkin (2003), monetary policy was procyclical during this 
period, since our estimate of ϖ  is significantly negative. Note that one advantage of 
                                                 
5 This choice of subperiods will be justified throughout the discussion of the results.   9
our separate analysis of money demand and supply, is that we can decompose the 
interest rate reaction to output gap (coefficient γ in equation (4)) in two parts. On the 
one hand, we have the elasticity of the money demand to output, which is significantly 
positive (0.62). On the other hand, we have the endogenous money supply response to 
output fluctuations. Because the former is larger than the latter, the interest rate 
response to output is positive in equilibrium, as table 2 reveals. By looking at the 
implied interest rate response to output, one would, incorrectly, conclude that monetary 
policy was countercyclical, when in reality the evidence suggests that it was 
significantly procyclical. Note that the estimates also show a large elasticity of the 
money demand to the interest rate (ζ  is 0.72 and significantly different from zero) and 
a not-too-strong reaction of the Fed to inflation (ψ is only 0.45, which yields an estimate 
of the implied interest rate reaction to inflation of β=0.62). 
Data for the second subperiod start at the beginning of 1977 and finish at the end of 
1982. The subperiod includes the 1979-1982 experience with money targeting. Since 
our data are quarterly, the 1979-1982 period includes only twelve observations (the 
announced money targeting period went from October 1979 to October 1982), 
insufficient to estimate the nineteen parameters of our model. Therefore, we include 
several additional observations around the money targeting period in order to allow for 
the estimation.
6 Table 1 shows that the Fed hardly accommodated money demand 
shocks during this second subsample. Our estimate of v is 0.44, significantly different 
from one, and quite close to, though significantly different from, zero. While the Fed did 
miss the money targets during 1979-1982, this result is consistent with the evidence in 
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) that money demand shocks were not routinely 
accommodated during this period. The fact that v is close to zero and that φ is close to 
one (table 2) is also consistent with the increased interest rate volatility (table 4) given 
that money demand now affects the interest rate directly. The Fed reduced the 
procyclicality of monetary policy during these years (the estimate of ω is still negative, 
but much smaller and not significantly different from zero). It also reacted more 
significantly to inflation, ψ=0.63 and the equilibrium response to inflation is the highest 
across subperiods (β =1.03). This result comes as no surprise, since the period 
includes the peak of inflation and the Volcker disinflation. The money demand elasticity 
to the interest rate is again quite large, although smaller than in any other subperiod. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that during this subperiod both the money supply and 
                                                 
6 A robustness analysis where the model is estimated for alternative subsamples of this second subperiod 
is available from the authors. The differences, especially with respect to the parameter v, were  not 
significant, although the more observations from other subperiods that were included, the higher the 
estimate of v, which clearly favors our conclusion of 1979-1982 being a money targeting period with v 
close or equal to zero.   10
money demand shocks are much higher than in the other subsamples, and also the 
variance of all macroeconomic variables -except money- is the largest of all 
subperiods. This suggests, again, a strong interest by the Fed to target money 
aggregates rather than the interest rate, and sharp movements in output and inflation 
as a consequence of the disinflation effort. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
The third subsample covers the 1984-2001 period. During these years inflation was 
mostly under control and the conduct of monetary policy has been by and large praised 
by policy makers and academics alike. This period is also acknowledged to display 
larger output stability (see McConnell and Quirós (2000)). According to Mishkin (2003), 
the Federal funds rate became the Fed's target during this period, especially after 
1994, when the Fed started to announce periodically a target for the Federal funds 
rate. Table 1 shows that the money supply response to output is small and non-
significantly procyclical. We find that during this period the Fed shrank the money 
growth process in response to inflationary pressures with a similar intensity to the pre-
Volcker period (the estimates of ψ are indeed similar across periods). The degree of 
money demand accommodation is close to and significantly indistinguishable from one, 
pointing at a clear interest rate targeting strategy from the Fed. It is noteworthy that 
even with v close to one (and φ close to zero), our implied estimate of β (0.67) is much 
lower than previous estimates in the literature for this period. Thus, it is clear that the 
less-than-perfect money demand shock accommodation leads to very different 
conclusions on the implied interest rate response to inflation. As these shocks exhibit a 
high degree of autocorrelation (between 0.6 and 0.9 across periods), this opens up an 
additional explanatory channel for interest rate dynamics. 
Our fourth subsample goes from 2001 to 2007. The rationale for the choice of this 
subperiod is twofold. First, in the third quarter of 2001, the Fed starts pursuing an 
aggressive expansionary policy in response to the recession and the terrorist attacks. 
Second, several authors and policy analysts have criticized the Fed’s policy during this 
year, defining it as overly expansionary, judging from the positive differential from the 
interest rate implied by a standard Taylor rule and the actual one (see Taylor, 2009). 
Therefore, we end the subsample in the second quarter of 2007, right before the 
beginning of the financial crisis. Table 1 shows that, in contrast to the other three 
periods, the Fed lowered the money stock in response to increases in output, thus 
acting in a countercyclical manner. With respect to inflation fluctuations, it lowered the 
money supply in response to an inflation increase with a similar intensity to the other 
periods (ψ=0.63). Finally, the Fed perfectly accommodated money demand shocks, as   11
the point estimate of v is 1.18 and not statistically different from one. Table 2 shows 
that the parameters implied in the equilibrium interest rate response function are similar 
to those in other periods, with the exception that the response to the money demand 
shock becomes slightly negative. As a result, the systematic monetary policy 
management in this subsample can be considered to be quite similar to that of the 
1984-2001 period.  
We now comment on the standard deviation of the structural shocks. In agreement with 
the evidence in Sims and Zha (2006), who find shock volatility drifts, the standard 
deviations of the structural shocks are clearly higher in the second period. This is not 
surprising since the end of the 70s and beginning of the 80s witnessed increased 
macroeconomic instability. For instance, the second oil shock took place during these 
years, leading to more volatile inflation shocks. The monetary policy authority struggled 
during this period to keep inflation under control and the monetary policy shock is 
almost twice as large as in the other two subsamples. Cogley and Sargent (2005) also 
show that the volatilities of these two shocks increased during this period. Regarding 
the output shocks, the second subsample includes a deep recession, leading to an 
enlarged negative output shock. Consistent with the “Great Moderation” literature 
(McConnell and Quirós, 2000; Stock and Watson, 2003)), output shocks were 
substantially smaller in the post-1984 samples. Finally, the money demand shock is 
also much more volatile during the second period than in the rest of the sample. As 
Mishkin (2003) points out, the intense financial innovation and deregulation of the early 
80s can be interpreted as a shock to the money demand, which would justify our 
estimated higher volatility. 
Finally, with respect to the monetary policy transmission mechanisms, we allow for the 
simultaneous effects of current interest rates and money stocks on future inflation and 
output dynamics (equations (9) and (10)). As table 3 shows, the elasticity of inflation 
and output to money changes is always positive. It is statistically significant in the first 
period for both inflation and output, and in the third and fourth period for inflation. With 
respect to the interest rate channel, the elasticity is always positive in the case of 
inflation (and statistically significant in the first and third periods) and negative in the 
first three subsamples in the case of output (but never statistically significant). Thus the 
money channel seems to be the more stable one, especially with respect to inflation 
dynamics. This finding casts some doubts on the validity of models which include the 
interest rate as the only relevant transmission mechanism, such as the minimalist 
three-variable, three-equation New-Keynesian macro system, where the only relevant 
monetary policy channel is the real rate effect on output combined with the Phillips 
curve.   12
(Insert Tables 2 to 3 about here) 
 
3.3 Macroeconomic Dynamics: 1970-2007 
In the following subsection we analyze the impact of money supply and money demand 
shocks in the money market, output and inflation. First, we show the implied money 
demand and money supply shocks and study the effects of these shocks on inflation 
and output via impulse response and variance decomposition analysis. We then draw 
some lessons for monetary policy and comment on the developments occurred since 
the beginning of the financial crisis in the summer of 2007. 
 
3.3.1 Money Shocks 
Figure 1 compares the estimated autocorrelated money demand shocks (ε
d
t) along with 
the path of the Federal funds rate across sample periods. In the first subsample, the 
money demand shock seems to be leading the interest rate. In contrast, the money 
demand shock seems to be driving some of the interest rate fluctuations during the 
1977-1982 period contemporarily, especially during this latter part of the subsample, 
coinciding with the money supply targeting period. In the 1984-2001 period, we 
observe a positive relation between the interest rate and the money demand shock at 
long frequencies, whereas in the 2001-2007 period, there seems to be no clear relation 
except in the last years: these latter years display a positive correlation in 2006, but a 
negative one in 2007. Figure 2 compares the money demand shocks with M2. Overall, 
the autocorrelated money demand shocks track money supply at low frequencies, 
across subsamples, especially in the 1970-1979 period. This, we believe, is good 
evidence that our estimation has correctly identified the shock to money demand. 
Figure 3 compares the estimated autocorrelated money supply shocks (ε
p
t) with the 
path of the Federal funds rate across sample periods. The money supply shocks track 
the Federal funds rate at low frequencies, especially in the last two subsamples, where 
they look like a smooth version of the rate series. Figure 4 compares the money supply 
shocks with M2. There is a clear negative relation between the autocorrelated 
monetary policy shocks and the money aggregate across periods. This finding is due to 
the strong interest rate elasticity of money demand found across sample periods. The 
inverse relationship between the money demand shock and the monetary aggregate is 
apparent in all periods, which we believe to be good evidence that the shock identified 
corresponds to monetary policy.  
 
(Insert Figures 1 to 4 about here) 
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3.3.2 Impulse Response and Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Figure 5 displays the impulse responses of the four macro variables to money supply 
and money demand shocks across sample periods. Table 4 shows data on the implied 
variance decompositions and the historical and model implied variances of the main 
variables. Several findings are worth highlighting. The price puzzle -a significant 
increase in inflation following a contractionary money supply shock, first noted by Sims 
(1992)- is only present in the first period. Leeper and Roush (2003) were the first to 
note that the price puzzle disappears when money enters structural VARs. As they 
point out, the reason is that a monetary policy shock decreases money demand, 
lowering inflation subsequently. Our estimates reflect this intuition crisply, as the 
interest rate elasticity of money demand is large and significant. Since the lag of money 
enters directly and significantly into the inflation equation with a positive sign (a14 > 0 in 
all four periods), inflation declines following the contractionary money supply shock. 
Notice that the interest rate lag enters with a positive sign in the first, third and fourth 
periods and it is almost zero in the second one. Because this coefficient is very large in 
the 1970-1979 period, the price puzzle arises then, as it dominates over the money 
demand effect. One possible interpretation is that the Fed's increases in the interest 
rate signalled higher inflation rates, perhaps due to the negative experience with 
inflation in the 70s. Romer and Romer (2000) find that monetary policy actions have 
helped forecast future inflation over the last thirty years. Interestingly, in their reduced-
form regressions, they also find that higher interest rates predict higher inflation and 
that the corresponding projection coefficients are larger during the 70s. Hanson (2004), 
performing a rigorous VAR analysis, also finds that the price puzzle is mostly a pre-
1979 phenomenon.  
Figure 5 also shows that inflation increases following money demand shocks across 
periods. This finding goes against the logic of the static IS-LM model, but it is a 
straightforward implication of our semi-structural model, where monetary policy is 
transmitted through interest rates and money shocks, and where money demand 
shocks increase money stocks. Our simple model can accommodate this fact, given 
that the money market always clears. Since an increase in money aggregates predicts 
future increases of inflation and output, money demand shocks produce an increase in 
each of the two variables. Notice also that the implied increase in the interest rate is not 
enough to offset the effect of money stocks on output. In the case of inflation, since 
higher interest rates predict higher inflation, the inflationary effect of money demand 
shocks is amplified. 
One stylized fact of the impulse response functions is that money supply and money 
demand shocks have had less influence on the inflation and output dynamics in the   14
post-1984 period. In other words, money market shocks have not driven aggregate 
fluctuations during this period. The diminishing relevance of money shocks on output 
and inflation is in agreement with Moreno (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006), who 
exclusively focus on monetary policy shocks. In our setting, the variance 
decompositions in table 4 make more transparent the relative importance of money 
demand and money supply shocks across subsamples. While money demand and 
money demand shocks jointly drove around 50% of the inflation and output dynamics in 
the 1970-1979, they only explain around 20% in the remaining subsamples.  
Figure 5 also shows that the interest rate and M2 strongly react to both money demand 
and money supply shocks. An increase in a money demand shock increases the 
interest rates and the money stock, whereas a contractionary money supply shock 
decreases the money stock and increases the interest rate, thus generating a sensible 
negative liquidity effect in the money market. The variance decompositions confirm that 
the interest rate and M2 are mostly driven by money supply and money demand 
shocks across all periods. 
Finally, table 4 clearly shows that the variance of all macro variables greatly decreased 
after 1984. Since after 1984 the macro variables are driven by their equation-specific 
shocks and table 1 shows that these shocks are significantly smaller in the last two 
subsamples, we can conclude that the smaller size of the structural shocks is directly 
related to the lower macroeconomic volatility in the macroeconomy. 
(Insert Table 4 and Figure 5 about here) 
 
3.3 Some Lessons for Policy 
We now draw some policy lessons from our empirical analysis described above.  
•  The announced and identified money targeting strategy of the 1979-1982 period 
implied that the interest rate was mostly driven by money demand shocks (more 
than 40% of its total variation, according to table 4). As it is now clear, this 
strategy was indeed effective in lowering the inflation rate. 
•  After 1984, during the identified interest rate targeting periods, more than 75% 
of interest rate dynamics are explained by the money supply (policy) shock. 
Thus, whenever the interest rate monetary policy transmission mechanism is 
strong, interest rate targeting seems an effective strategy to control output and 
inflation fluctuations. 
•  The choice of intermediate policy target (either the interest rate, through perfect 
money demand shock accommodation, or the money stock) seems not to affect 
the dynamic response of the remaining macroeconomic variables. Thus, the   15
choice of the intermediate target can be done on the basis of the preference for 
interest versus money stock stabilization.  
•  The transaction motive of money demand seems to be losing relevance after 
2001. This has a key implication for policy making under interest rate targeting, 
since, in our equilibrium setting, this reduces the implied interest rate response 





= ). In the last subsample, the Fed has indeed 
adjusted this effect by reacting countercyclically to output gap fluctuations in the 
money supply rule.  
•  Inflation and output have been very stable from 1984 to 2007. According to our 
analysis, during that period they were mostly driven by their own shocks. Thus, 
it seems on the one hand that the economic environment has been more 
benign after 1984, confirming previous results in the “Great Moderation” 
literature. On the other hand, money shocks have not increased output and 
inflation volatility, even if they are driving most of the interest rate and M2 
dynamics. This is evidence of an increased credibility of the monetary policy 
management by the private sector. Thus, in this enhanced credibility 
environment, it seems adequate for the monetary policy authority to focus on 
interest rate and financial markets stabilization, rather than on output and 
inflation management. 
 
3.4 On the 2008 Financial Crisis 
In the build-up towards the 2008 financial crisis, macro variables were behaving in a 
very stable manner. Figure 6 shows this very clearly, as it plots our four macro series 
from 2005 to 2009. After the credit crunch of August 2007, the Fed decided to lower the 
interest rates aggressively in order to mitigate the effects of the upcoming crisis, so that 
the interest rate was the first variable to react significantly. It wasn’t until a year later 
when the effects of the crisis started to show in the remaining variables: output and 
inflation decreased drastically and M2 increased steeply. Thus the Fed first lowered 
interest rates towards the 0% floor and flooded the financial markets with liquidity, 
increasing M2 very aggressively. Thus, until “normality” is restored, monetary policy 
probably will have little effect on output or inflation. In fact, and consistent with the last 
implication in subsection 3.3, monetary policy in the last two years has probably been 
disconnected from the traditional objectives of output and inflation stabilization, in order 
to focus on financial system stabilization: massive injections of liquidity have not had a 
major impact on inflation and output –among other things due to the lack of channelling   16
of credit from the banks to firms in order to improve their balance-sheets- and will 
probably take a long time to affect output in a noticeable manner. 
Once we are out of the crisis, when data become available we’ll probably see a break 
in the values of the parameters that measure the relationship between money and 
interest rates, on the one hand, and output and inflation, on the other, and also a break 
in the parameters of the monetary policy rule itself, since the Fed –and other Central 
Banks- are right now not looking at output or inflation (or only indirectly) but rather at 
the financial system’s needs for liquidity. At this point in time, however, this conclusion 
is tentative and not yet testable. 




Much of the current empirical monetary policy analysis abstracts from the influence of 
money demand shocks on interest rates, inflation and output. We have shown in this 
paper that this assumption is not completely innocuous: the degree of accommodation 
of money demand shocks has not always been complete and this affects both 
monetary policy management and implied macro dynamics. A second goal of our paper 
was to disentangle the effects of money demand and money supply shocks on macro 
dynamics. We showed that distinguishing both shocks leads to sensible predictions of 
the dynamics of output and inflation, and to a better understanding of the workings of 
monetary policy and its effect on output and inflation. We show, however, that the 
differences between money targeting or interest rate targeting procedures seem to limit 
to the behavior of the monetary policy instrument, and there do not seem to be large 
implications for the dynamics of output or inflation. In the light of the experience of 
recent years, our results suggest that monetary policy may be “dying of its own 
success”, since the major stabilization of both output and inflation –which is, in part, 
due to smaller macro shocks, but also to better past monetary policy - are reducing 
greatly the scope for traditional measures of monetary policy effectiveness. An 
additional goal of financial system stabilization seems to have been at play in recent 
monetary policy actions, and this adds a new dimension to traditional monetary policy 
analysis, which should be of high interest for researchers in the immediate future, 
especially in the light of the recent crisis suffered by the financial system. Finally, some 
comments regarding monetary policy in the recent financial crises were also offered as 
an afterthought of our analysis. 
We have stressed the relevance of a money channel additional to the interest rate 
channel in the transmission of monetary policy actions. One step in the research   17
agenda would be to device a more complete macro model which allowed for less-than-
perfect money demand accommodation and that included money balance effects on 
both supply and demand specifications. Another item on the agenda is to extend the 
study to other countries. Of special interest would be Germany and Switzerland, two 
countries whose Central Banks have explicitly implemented money targeting during 
several decades. Our analysis may provide a useful explanation of macro dynamics in 
those settings. Moreover, the results in this paper suggest that our simple setup can 
give valuable information on the behavior of Central Banks and the private sector for 
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Posterior Estimates of Structural Parameters in the Four Periods 
  Prior  Mean  Prior  S.D.  70:1-79:3 77:1-82:4 84:1-01:2 01:3-07:2 
θ 0.50  0.30  0.616*  0.501*  0.365*  0.244 
ζ  1.00  0.30  0.715* 0.605* 0.780* 0.883* 
ω 0.50  0.50  -0.461*  -0.289  -0.166  0.117* 








Ψ  0.70  0.88  0.445* 0.626* 0.524* 0.748* 
σd  0.15  0.15  1.259* 1.710* 0.530* 0.703* 
σp  0.15  0.15  0.572* 0.932* 0.496* 0.545* 
σy  0.15  0.15  0.786* 1.157* 0.481* 0.369* 
σπ  0.15  0.15  1.358* 2.380* 1.146* 1.643* 
ρd  0.50  0.15  0.768* 0.607* 0.903* 0.685* 
ρp 0.50  0.15  0.688*  0.806  0.887*  0.840* 
* Denotes that the 90% confidence interval for the parameter does not contain zero. For the 





Implied Estimates of the Equilibrium Interest Rate Rule Parameters 
  70:1-79:3  77:1-82:4 84:1-01:2 01:3-07:2 
β  0.622  1.035 0.672 0.847 
γ  0.217  0.350 0.255 0.409 
φ 0.284  0.922  0.168  -0.202 












Posterior Estimates of Monetary Policy Transmission Parameters 
  Prior  Mean  Prior  S.D.  70:1-79:3 77:1-82:4 84:1-01:2 01:3-07:2 
a13  -0.10 0.50  0.452*  -0.029  0.229*  0.132 
a23 -0.10  0.50 -0.108  -0.009  -0.003  0.013 
a14 0.10  0.50 0.189*  0.376  0.367*  0.418* 
a24  0.10  0.50  0.256*  0.224 0.026 0.039 




Historical and Model Implied Standard Deviations of Macro Variables 
and Proportion of Variance Decomposition Attributed to the Monetary 
Shocks 
   70:1-79:3  77:1-82:4 84:1-01:2 01:3-07:2 
Output   σHist  1.814  1.764 0.819 0.492 
  σModel 1.576  2.098 1.017 0.625 
 %  η
d  0.239  0.173 0.065 0.091 
 %  η
p 0.294  0.168 0.120 0.111 
Inflation  σHist  2.981  3.421 1.414 1.669 
  σModel 3.594  3.827 1.408 1.667 
 %  η
d  0.384  0.114 0.245 0.079 
 %  η
p 0.116  0.113 0.052 0.023 
Money  σHist  3.325  1.988 1.319 1.104 
  σModel 2.316  1.836 1.464 1.165 
 %  η
d  0.450  0.397 0.372 0.589 
 %  η
p 0.410  0.296 0.609 0.401 
Interest rate  σHist  2.582  3.948 1.986 1.608 
  σModel 2.379  3.894 1.496 1.125 
 %  η
d  0.363  0.416 0.141 0.104 
 %  η
p 0.425  0.191 0.760 0.855   22
Figure 1 




Money Supply (Detrended) and Money Demand shocks (Subsamples) 
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Figure 3 





Money Supply (Detrended) and Money Supply shocks (Subsamples) 
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Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
Macro Variables Before and After the Financial Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 